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   `When he travelled he took along his own cherished convictions and theories. Perhaps his 
travels were even motivated by the desire to return home with confirmation of these theories. 
And who can trust his eyes when under these circumstances he saw everywhere exactly what 
he wanted to see!' wrote Christian Wilhelm Dohm in 1774 about Engelbert Kaempfer. 
   Curiously enough, these critical phrases were contained in a pamphlet advertising Dohm's 
new German edition of Kaempfer's History of Japan.' Naturally, the greater part of this 
pamphlet was praising the work it wanted to sell, extolling, among other things, the author's 
keen judgment, his precision and intellect. The fact that Dohm went against his own self-
interest by calling attention to a fault in the work, speaks of the seriousness with which he 
regarded this alleged weakness in Kaempfer's writings. 
   In his epilogue to Kaempfer's Geschichte and Beschreibung von Japan, Dohm made no secret 
of the fact that he was troubled by Kaempfer's high praise for the Eastern Nation. However, 
what worried Dohm most and what he, as aspiring historian, civil servant and diplomat, felt 
the need to distance himself from, was Kaempfer's description of the fifth Tokugawa Shogun 
Tsunayoshi as perfect ruler and the shogun's administration as the perfect government.2 
   Dohm, like many of his contemporaries, could not accept that at times Kaempfer 
considered the heathen Japanese superior to his most Christian European contemporaries. In 
this respect his criticism of Kaempfer's work must be dismissed as biased and uninformed. 
However, in one respect Dohm was right. Already very early in his life, Kaempfer had mapped 
out a political utopia which curiously resembled the aspirations of the fifth Tokugawa shogun 
Tsunayoshi, and when Kaempfer came to Japan he saw `exactly what he wanted to see.' 
   In 1673 the young Kaempfer had ambitiously chosen the difficult subject of sovereignty 
as topic for his school matriculation theses. Entitled Exercitatio Politica de Majestatis Divisione 
.... (Political discourse on the Division of Sovereignty) the essay, contrary to what the title 
might suggest, argued that by definition majestatis, sovereignty, is indivisible and omnipotent.3 
In this conclusion Kaempfer followed his famous predecessors Jean Bodin and Thomas 
Hobbes.4 Like them he was convinced that a mistaken judgement in this matter would have 
the gravest political consequences, leading to civil war and rebellion.5 Yet Kaempfer mentions 
neither Bodin nor Hobbes. He did not have to go so far afield. The question was hotly 
debated amongst scholars, and Kaempfer cites a host of German jurists and university 
professors who all wrote with authority on the subject.
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   Kaempfer names the work of twelve legal experts of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century who maintained that sovereignty can indeed be divided into the personal authority of 
the monarch and the greater authority of the state. Just as the moon is dependent on the sun 
for its lustre, it was argued, so the sovereignty of the ruler is dependent on and limited by the 
constitution of the state.6 Kaempfer, however, saw his ideal encapsulated in words attributed 
to Alexander the Great: `Just as the world cannot be ruled by two suns, the state cannot be 
governed by two authorities concurrently.'? He mentions the writings of nine authorities to 
support his view and indicates that there are many more. Why was this question of such 
importance to Kaempfer and his contemporaries? 
   Cardinal Mazarin died when Kaempfer was ten. Since then, Louis XIV, the self-styled rot 
de soleil, had consolidated his personal, absolute leadership. Kaempfer's plea for indivisible 
and omnipotent sovereignty, as well as his symbolism, appear very much inspired by the 
French ruler who maintained: L'etat, c'est mot. 
   Yet Kaempfer was no admirer of Louis XIV. In the first sentence of his History of Japan, 
he cynically remarked that on his departure from Sweden, Germany was threatened by its 
most Christian and most un- Christian enemies. The most Christian enemy was, of course, 
Louis XIV, whose alliance with the Osman Turks permitted them to reach the gates of 
Vienna. 
   Kaempfer's omnipotent ruler was an utopian figure. He was neither Louis XIV, nor 
Kaempfer's later employer, the Duke of Detmold, as whose `slave' he described himself 
towards the end of his life.' He was a sage king. Kaempfer states: `A king ... who is solely 
intent on his own advantage is degenerate,' and concludes his discourse with the statement 
that the tyranny of the Roman rulers did not deserve to be called sovereignty.9 
    Commentators on Kaempfer's work have been perplexed at the contradictions they believe 
are inherent in his progressive acceptance of other religions, customs and races, and his 
conservative views on government. I have argued elsewhere that Kaempfer's abhorrence of 
any form of popular government was based to a large extent on the experience of his youth. 
Lemgo, his hometown, acquired the dubious fame of burning the largest number of women as 
witches. The height of this persecution was reached in Kaempfer's teens. His father, the 
principal vicar, apparently ignored this unholy behaviour, but his uncle, the junior vicar, 
admonished the city councillors and mayor from the pulpit. For this he was accused as being 
in league with the devil and finally pronounced guilty and sentenced to death in the name of 
the University of Giej3en, the institution responsible for such judgements. Later, in his 
Amoenitates Exoticae, Kaempfer forcefully expressed his anger at those who locally conducted 
the inquisition, brandishing them as `frequently uneducated, biased, if not to say greedy, cruel, 
and wicked people'.10 While the death sentence of the uncle was pronounced by the 
University of Gie(3en, the responsibility rested with the local government of the mayor and his 
city elders. Kaempfer had learnt early in life that the government of the people was corrupt 
and could not be trusted. There was a need for an all-powerful sage king to curb the excesses 
of the common, uneducated people.
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   Kaempfer's personal experience might readily explain why this enlightened scholar, 
pleading for religious toleration, was, at the same time, advocating political absolutism. Yet 
Kaempfer was not alone in endorsing positions which appear incompatible today. One modern 
scholar, noting these same, `paradoxical' tendencies in Bodin wrote: `Thus political 
absolutism and religious toleration, the improbable twins of the modern state system, make 
their first appearance in the writing of this enigmatic sixteenth-century French lawyer." 
   Absolutism was not only endorsed by those who were enlightened enough to plead for 
religious toleration. Even the advocates of the natural law theory, scholars who believed that 
every man, however humble, had some inalienable rights, were proponents of political 
absolutism. Today man like Hobbes are accused of insincerity when they argue both for the 
rights of the individual and the authority of an omnipotent ruler. The work of Samuel 
Pufendorf, one of the best known defenders of the natural law theory, has been described as 
`honeycombed with juxtaposed and unresolved combinations.12 Such `contradictions' are 
similarly apparent in the writings of Leibniz, the famous liberal thinker and student of 
China. ls 
   The reason for these apparent inconsistencies in political thought must ultimately be 
sought in the political situation of the period. 
   The Thirty Years War had exposed the Holy Roman Empire as no more than an empty 
shell. The emperor did not hold sovereign power. He presided over a loose federation of some 
355 political units, each of which could enter a virtually limitless combination of alliances 
within and outside the empire: an extraordinary political `monster' as Samuel Pufendorf called 
it. 14 Lacking unified direction, this `monster' was unable to defend itself, but divided and 
dismembered, its splinters generated enormous destructive powers. With the right alliances, in 
themselves insignificant political units wreaked havoc far beyond their actual capacity, 
permitting, in turn, outside competitors, such as France and Sweden, to feed on the spoils. It 
is estimated that on average the Thirty Years' War wiped out some forty per cent of the 
population, in some some states, such as Mecklenburg, Hessen, Pfalz and Wurtenberg, the 
loss was up to seventy per cent.15 Those who survived regarded their local rulers with the 
utmost of contempt, and expressed nothing but disdain for their fellow countrymen, who, once 
law and order broke down, were often as guilty of violence and destruction as invading 
soldiers. 16 Small wonder then that contemporaries were unable to imagine that feudal lords, 
let alone commoners, were capable of governing. 
   The Treaty of Westphalia brought an end to continuous carnage and devastation, but it 
did not solve the contradictions inherent in the political system, nor eliminate the threat of 
war. 
   Europe was engaged in an important paradigm change, and the 17th century witnessed 
the most painful stages of this process. Under the cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, France 
had developed into a centralized state, corresponding already largely to the modern national 
unit. The German states were eager to imitate the roi de soleil, but still bound to the empire by 
a code of feudal laws. The friction between late feudal administration and the rise of 
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absolutism dominated politics after the Peace of Westphalia. The war against the Osman 
Turks, conducted mainly by the emperor, the house of Hapsburg, invested the empire 
temporarily with renewed importance as feudal alliance of Christian states. Yet the clock 
could not be put back: the medieval framework no longer corresponded to the realities. 
Opportunism reigned; countless alliances made and broken led to sporadic fighting, and the 
constant threat of full-scale war dominated the second half of the 17th century. The question 
of how the continual squabbling of lesser and greater feudal barons could be stopped was of 
greatest importance. 
   The lifes of men like Kaempfer, Leibniz and Pufendorf - but also Bodin and Hobbes in 
France and England before them -, were dominated by the memory and threat of war and 
insurrection. If they had one common utopia, then it was government promising eternal peace. 
In the political climate of the day, men's right to live in peace was the most important right. 
Experience had shown that neither feudal lords nor commoners could be trusted to act 
ethically and respect the property of their neighbours. 17 At the time the only political solution 
to secure for men the right to live unmolested appeared to be the absolute state, where the 
authority of the ruler was undivided and not contended. 18 
   Political absolutism and peace Kaempfer found in Japan. Although peace had already 
prevailed for many generations when Kaempfer arrived there in 1690, the political situation 
had, nevertheless, certain similarities with that of his native country. While the Holy Roman 
Empire was split into some 355 political units, Japan had some 250 han, governed more or 
less autonomously by their daimyo. Just as the Reichstag, the diet of the empire, was staffed by 
the members of the empire and met at Regensburg, the daimyo occupied the highest posts in 
the central administration at Edo. 
   The similarities went deeper than mere appearances. Japan was, like Europe, engaged in 
an important paradigm change. The Warring States Period had demonstrated the 
ineffectiveness of the medieval order. The vestiges of a feudal- type system had been on a 
collision course with new ambitions of absolutism. But the Tokugawa had somehow 
succeeded to avoid this collision. Or rather, had succeeded into turning it into a prolonged, 
but - until the final stages - peaceful tug-of-war. 
   Kaempfer visited Japan at a time when shogunal powers were at their height. When he 
travelled to Edo in 1691/ 92, the country had recovered from the natural disasters of the 
Tenna Period (1681-84) and not yet been subjected to those at the turn of the century. The 
economy was booming, as the novels of Ihara Saikaku readily attest. Initial protest to 
Tsunayoshi's policy of relying on his chamberlains rather than the daimyo in the government 
of the country, had proved ineffective. Many of their rights and duties were now concentrated 
in the hands of the grand chamberlain Makino Narisada, and his successor-designate, 
Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, was waiting in the wings. The scale of Japan was much smaller than 
that of the Holy Roman Empire, but what Kaempfer saw, provided him with confirmation of 
his theory that absolutism was necessary to maintain the all-essential peace. Kaempfer noted 
that also here in Japan the common populace was interested in their local welfare only, and 
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the stubborn petty rulers were `thirsting for political authority."9 Yet the Tokugawa had 
managed to build up a system of such stringent laws and police their subjects with such 
ingenuity that their destructive political ambitions were held in check, and peace was being 
maintained. When Kaempfer learnt, moreover, that the ruler was a studied man, extending 
unprecedented patronage to scholars, there could be no doubt for him that the Japanese had 
never been more fortunate than under their present government.20 Kaempfer was not uncritical 
of Japan, but its political structure closely approximated his utopia. 
   While Kaempfer admired the absolutism of Alexander the Great, Tsunayoshi saw that of 
the Confucian sage kings Yao and Shun as his model .21 These fabled rulers of Chinese 
antiquity did not share their authority with hereditary feudal lords, as he and his predecessors, 
but ruled through ministers selected and appointed by themselves. 
   There is no detailed treatise revealing the political structure of the shogun's vision 
generally he is accused of lacking any political foresight whatsoever -, but an examination 
of the record reveals that from the first days of his government his utopia of absolute 
authority provided the motivation for his political reforms. What Kaempfer saw and found 
praise-worthy when he arrived in 1690 in Japan, reveals itself as the outcome of a decade of 
intense political manoeuvring to diminish the might of the powerful daimyo who, especially in 
their capacity of Senior Councillors, shared the shogun's authority and were able to impede 
any policies he might wish to enact. 
   Only days after becoming shogun, Tsunayoshi installed his long-time retainer, tutor and 
confidant, Makino Narisada, as his official chamberlain at Edo castle.22 Just over one month 
later he directed that daimyo were no longer to use the Senior Councillors as intermediaries, 
requiring them to direct any communication with the shogun via the chamberlains.23 On that 
same day he dealt another blow to the established authority of the Senior Councillors by 
appointing his favourite among them, Hotta Masatoshi, as solely responsible for the 
administration of farmers.24 Previously these duties had been shared in monthly rotation by 
all Senior Councillors. As the overwhelming part of the government's revenue was derived 
from the taxation of farmers, this effectively put Hotta Masatoshi in charge of government 
finance. This situation was confirmed some days later when Tsunayoshi stated that Hotta was 
to be in charge of koku yo no koto (national finance), and strengthened his position by placing a 
number of high ranking officials under him, including an inspector.25 The elevation of a man 
who had demonstrated his personal loyalty shortly previously when Tsunayoshi's succession 
to the shogunate was threatened, was completed when he was made Great Councillor (tairo ) 
later in the year. On the same day the faithful Makino Narisada was elevated to Grand 
Chamberlain (gosoba yonin ).26 Narisada, we are told, became the "eyes and ears" of 
Masatoshi.21 
   The question of whether Hotta Masatoshi was a forerunner of government by the shogun's 
favourites, the Chamberlains, acting under his personal direction, or whether he served as an 
independent administrator similar to the former tairo Sakai Tadakiyo, is a debated one, and 
indicates how little historians know about his political activities.28 Nor has it been established
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what motivated the Junior Councillor Inaba Masayasu to assassinate Masatoshi, his senior 
relative, in Edo castle in 1684, at the cost of his own life. A contemporary, the scholar Toda 
Mosui, noted in his diary how Masatoshi had misused the authority entrusted to him, and 
even recorded the rumour that he planned to dispose of the shogun to rule the country as the 
Hojo had done in Kamakura times. In Mosui's eyes, Masayasu was a man of unparalleled 
loyalty to the shogun who sacrificed his own life to restore authority to the ruler.29 
   Historians can only speculate whether the particular form in which Masayasu chose to 
display his loyalty was in response to the shogun's prompting, or had grown out of his own 
observations and convictions. Certain is that Tsunayoshi used the incident to further entrench 
his Chamberlain government. As Masatoshi's assassination took place close to the shogunal 
chambers in Edo castle, the shogun decreed, ostensibly as a security measure, that the offices 
of the Senior Councillors be moved to a more distant part of the castle, and that all 
communication with him be channelled via the Chamberlains. This meant that the Senior 
Councillors had lost their role as power brokers and been replaced by the Chamberlains as the 
shogun's closest advisers.30 A year later Toda Mosui wrote about the shogun's chamberlains: 
  `The three men Makino Bingo no Kami, Matsudaira Iga no Kami and Kitami Wakasa no 
   Kami serve the shogun in a manner unheard of in previous reigns. They are below the 
  Senior Councillors, but above the Junior Councillors. The authority of Makino Bingo no 
   Kami, however, is greater than that of a Senior Councillor.'31 
   When Kaempfer arrived in Edo for his first audience with the shogun in 1691, he was 
told that there were five Senior Councillors, and the first was Makino Bingo no Kami.32 
Moreover, Kaempfer noted: `This Bingo, or Bengo, used to be the shogun's guardian and 
foster father before he became shogun. Now he is his most intimate councillor and the only 
one whom the shogun trusts.'33 True to the tradition of Yao and Shun, Tsunayoshi had 
succeeded in installing his personal follower as the country's single most powerful minister, 
but he was to be far less successful in handling the large administrative machinery that 
controled the day-to-day government of the country. 
   While Kaempfer asserted with Alexander the Great that a state could not be governed by 
two suns, Tsunayoshi maintained that just as the sun illuminates the smallest pebble of the 
realm, the shogun is responsible even for the lowliest of his subjects. He made this assertion 
early in his government when Hotta Masatoshi reported to him how he had been touched by 
the abject poverty of two street urchins. According to his own record, Masatoshi had felt the 
impulse to help, but had then decided that caring for the lowest of society was beyond the 
duty of the shogun's minister. Masatoshi described how Tsunayoshi corrected him, stating 
that the shogun was responsible for all the people of the realm, however lowly their status.34 
This simple story illustrates an important paradigm change, and the fact that the senior 
minister chose to record for posterity how his views required correction by the ruler, confirms 
that it was an abrupt and unexpected in Masatoshi's eyes perhaps even inappropriate 
shift from the accepted norm. Masatoshi had reacted to the situation according to the rules of 
the hierarchical delegation of authority characteristic of the feudal state. Tsunayoshi,
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however, took this occasion to express his utopian vision of the centralized, or autocratic 
state. Not the lower officials were responsible for the care of the street urchins, but the 
shogun and the minister to whom he had delegated his authority. 
    I have argued in greater detail elsewhere that this political utopia was the binding thread 
of Tsunayoshi's diverse and much criticized political stratagems.35 Thus his debasement of 
the coinage and other financial policies, such as the abolition of individual domain currencies 
(hansatsu), and fixing the exchange rate of gold and silver, eroded the financial autonomy of 
the domains. The profits from the debasement not only strengthened the financial position of 
the ruler, but also established the principle that the ruler had a right to draw on the wealth of 
the whole country, regardless of domain boundaries.36 
    The judgement of the famous Forty-seven ronin (masterless samurai) case, again, asserted 
the principle that the laws of the central government must precede over those of the domain: 
though personal loyalty was still of utmost importance, punishing the ronin for defending the 
honour of their dead master indicated that personal and particular relationships now took 
second place to the demands of the state. 
   The policy which has perplexed historians most, and has been harshly criticized by 
contemporaries and later generations alike, is Tsunayoshi's infamous shorui awaremi no rei 
(Laws of Compassion). This policy, however, is no more than the logical extension of 
Tsunayoshi's view that "just as the sun illuminates the smallest pebble of the realm, the 
shogun is responsible even for the lowliest of his subjects." As the name indicates, these laws 
not only protected street urchins and even the unborn child but also all other `living 
beings.' For the samurai the most burdensome and therefore most criticized aspect of these 
laws was the protection of dogs, which many of them kept in great numbers. True to his 
vision of the centralized, autocratic state, Tsunayoshi stated that `both people of high status 
and of low status' had to observe the laws when he condemned one of his own vetenarians to 
death for having killed his neighbour's dog in anger.37 
   For most of the samurai, Tsunayoshi's utopian vision of the state had little to recommend 
itself. Except for the fortunate few who on account of the shogun's personal favours or their 
special expertise, or talents, rose far above their inherited station in life, it entailed loss of 
authority as in the case of the daimyo - or additional onerous duties, as, for instance, 
when the lower officials were charged with taking care of orphans, sick travellers and, to the 
great amusement of the crowds of commoners, were even sent out to chase stray dogs.38 The 
lack of support from the samurai class, in charge of the overwhelming part of the country's 
administration, meant that Tsunayoshi's political vision remained a utopian one. 
   In his account of the shogun's government, Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, who succeeded 
Makino Narisada as Grand Chamberlain and most powerful minister, lamented that the 
shogun's policies were obstructed "on all levels, and it was impossible to succeed." He 
concluded: 
   `During his thirty years of governing the people, the shogun wanted to make the world 
like that of Yao and Shun. But the intentions of his early government were not fulfilled. Now 
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who is to blame for this? The Ancients [of China] lamented, "There was a lord worthy to be 
called a lord, but he had no ministers worthy of the name." Indeed, although the country is 
different, the saying remains true.'39 
Conclusion 
   Scholars have debated at length the differences and similarities of European and 
Japanese feudalism. Regardless of the disparities, it can be said for both parts of the world 
that continuous fighting between `petty kings' discredited government of the feudal type and 
nourished the utopia of a grand, all-powerful and just ruler. 
   Japan's three great unifiers, Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa leyasu, 
ostensibly established their hegemony by military means. However, their victories would not 
have been as swift if especially the powerful `outside' lords, the tozama daimyo, had not 
recognized that partial submission to a greater political unit was more advantageous than 
continuous warfare for complete autonomy. Much the same can be said of the `electors' that 
met at Regensburg to chose the so-called Holy Roman Emperor. In both cases, however, the 
supreme ruler was no more than a compromise: he was lacking the authority as well as the 
wisdom and respect that would make his position strategically and morally unassailable. The 
political greatness attributed to Yao and Shun, or Alexander the Great, remained a utopian 
vision. 
    Nevertheless, the centralized, autocratic state was eventually to become the form of 
government in both Japan and Europe. While these autocratic states might have been lacking 
in sage rulers, their political authority was such that, regardless of the realties, the image of 
the great ruler could be constructed and imposed upon the people. 
   Both in Europe and Japan these autocratic states have been replaced by democratic 
government, and from the standpoint of the late twentieth century, the utopian visions of 
seventeenth century Europe and Japan have a strong reactionary flavour. Max Weber, 
however, argues convincingly that absolutism, which replaces feudal lords with bureaucrats in 
the administration of the country, is an essential stage in the development of the modern 
democratic state.40 If Weber's proposition is accepted, than the utopian structures of 
government of men like Engelbert Kaempfer and the fifth Tokugawa shogun Tsunayoshi must 
be regarded as visionary and advanced for their age. 
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